

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

HAITI

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HISPANIOLA was the island chosen by Christopher Columbus for his first settlement. He called it La Isla Española, which was latinized into Hispaniola; others have called it by its Indian name, Haiti ("place of mountains"), or Santo Domingo after the first city in America. Today, Hispaniola's 30,000 square miles of mountains, valleys, and plains—about the size of Maine—belong to two nations, the eastern two-thirds to the Dominican Republic, the western third to Haiti.

Ill fortune has been the lot of the islanders ever since the day Columbus disembarked from the *Santa María*. He found Indians living in idyllic contentment: "So lovable, so tractable, so peaceable are these people . . .," he wrote his sovereigns, "there is not in the world a better nation nor a better land. They love their neighbors as themselves; and their discourse is ever sweet and gentle, and accompanied with a smile; and though it is true they are naked, yet their manners are decorous and praiseworthy." Within thirty years most of these lovable Indians were dead. Nor did the quarreling Spaniards find contentment here, for the veins of gold were soon exhausted, and the British, Dutch, and French took turns in molesting them. By 1550 the Spaniards had lost interest in the island, having found richer kingdoms to exploit in Mexico and Peru, and Hispaniola was left to the mercy of Spain's rivals. Buccaneers, chiefly French, settled on the island of Tortuga (turtle) off the northwestern coast and spilled over onto Hispaniola. In 1679 the western end of this island was ceded to the French; in 1795 Spain lost the eastern area to the same rival. Meanwhile, slave ships had been unloading their cargoes from Africa—most of them during the eighteenth century. Then in the 1790's, echoing the drum beats of the French Revolution, civil war broke out, involving mulattoes, Negroes, French, Spanish, and English, with the intrepid ex-slave Toussaint L'Ouver-

ture as Haiti's most dramatic figure. Out of a dozen years of bloodshed, free Haiti emerged in 1804 in control of the western end of the island. Four decades later, after turns of domination by France, Spain, and Haiti, the eastern two-thirds of the island gained freedom under the name of the Dominican Republic. But the curse of anarchy fixed upon the island was never lifted and seems to have dogged each step of the two little nations which divide the island between them.

Haiti's Beginnings, 1804-43

New Year's Day, 1804, was a proud independence day for the ragged Negro army of General Jean Jacques Dessalines. Napoleon's expeditionary force of 43,000 men had been defeated, more by yellow fever than by bullets, and only 8,000 had escaped. The years of fighting had brought great changes: in 1790 most of the land and almost all the 500,000 Negro slaves had been owned by 30,000 Frenchmen; by 1804 most of the French had fled or been killed, slavery had been abolished, and the Negroes and mulattoes had inherited the land. Dessalines, named governor general for life, was an ex-slave about fifty years old, illiterate, arrogant, and brutal. He had no aides with experience in statecraft. Most of the few whites that were left were butchered at Dessalines's orders. There were about 30,000 *gens de couleur*, the mulattoes who had been freed under French rule, including some who could read and write. There were half a million Negroes, almost entirely illiterate and possessed by two ideas: to be rid of everything that reminded them of their serfdom—even the church bells that used to call them to the fields were ripped from their moorings—and never to work again. The sugar fields which had enriched France for a century were overgrown with weeds.

Over this ravaged domain, the illiterate ex-slave Dessalines was formally appointed to rule by his companions-in-arms: "We swear," ran their declaration of allegiance, "entire obedience to the laws he shall deem fit to make, his authority being the only one we acknowledge. We authorize him to make peace and war, and to appoint his successor." A constitution was drafted, abolishing slavery forever, forbidding ownership of Haitian soil by any white man, and making the word "Negro" synonymous with "Haitian." Imitating the Napoleon whom he hated, Dessalines was crowned as Emperor Jacques I. Urged to create a peerage, he refused: "I, only I, am a noble." His deserving friends were given high posts in army and government, and were placed in charge of the onetime great French plantations. Aware that Haiti could be saved only by hard work, he drafted the now theoretically free peasants and assigned them to tasks and disciplines as onerous as any they had ever known. Under his cruel but

competent hand, there was marked recovery for two years; then the populace turned against him, and he himself was shot. There was little mourning for Dessalines in 1806, but today an iron statue of the Father of Independence holds a proud place in the Champs-de-Mars in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince.

The death of Dessalines in 1806 was followed by disruption of the little nation. North and south parted company for a time, under separate and very different rulers. In the north, from the city of Cap-Haïtien, Henri Christophe, last of the revolutionary generals, ruled from 1808 to 1820. An ex-slave and quite unlettered, Christophe had been one of the eight hundred Haitians to volunteer for service under Lafayette in the American Revolution and had fought at the battle of Savannah. Then he had been one of the most intrepid fighters in the Haitian war for independence. Now, supreme in northern Haiti, he ruled for twelve years with rough competence. In vainglory and with desire to impress his simple followers, he had himself crowned King Henri I. He filled his court with an imposing company of barons, counts, and knights; and built the elaborate royal palace of Sans Souci, and then, upon a mountain top, the citadel of La Ferrière, whose ruins are still among the great sights of America. The labor of thousands was conscripted for these monuments to his, and to Haiti's, glory. Like Dessalines, he permitted none to be idle. All able-bodied men were assigned to the fields and worked under military discipline. Profits from the long-neglected coffee trees increased. Some sugar fields were returned to cultivation. The "Black Caesar" enforced a regime which brought more security to his people than they had ever known before. Unschooling as he was, Christophe had profound respect for learning and invited scientists, especially from England, to visit his kingdom. His harsh discipline provoked grumbling and finally revolt. In 1820, after twelve years of benevolent despotism, Christophe, paralyzed from the hips down, killed himself—with a silver bullet, according to legend.

Meanwhile, in the south, Alexandre Pétion was the president of "the republic of Haiti" (1808-18). Pétion, a mulatto educated in France, had caught the infection of liberalism; he disliked tyranny, admired democracy to a degree, and gave his people a liberty of action which they had never hitherto enjoyed. He took over the great French plantations and parceled out the land in tiny plots to soldiers. The results of his indulgent course were disastrous. With compulsion removed, the peasants idled, gathered the untended coffee, planted a few crops which required little exertion, and lived meagerly. The national treasury received little from taxes or customs; a few foreign loans were negotiated at usurious rates; and unsupported paper money was issued to pay the bills. Pétion's government was under constant threat from Christophe's armies in the north and from disaffected generals in the south. Although his ten-year rule had slight success, Pétion stands as the most attractive of Haitian presidents.

much beloved by a people whom he served little. In the larger Spanish American record, Pétion is remembered for the aid he rendered Simón Bolívar in 1815-16 when the Liberator sought refuge in Haiti after defeats in Venezuela. In return for arms and food, Pétion exacted a pledge that Bolívar would end slavery in all the lands he liberated—a pledge Bolívar sought but failed to redeem.

Haiti was reunited under Jean Pierre Boyer, who succeeded Pétion in 1818 in the south, took over rule of the north after Christophe's suicide in 1820, and then, for good measure, annexed the eastern end of the island in 1822, when the people of Santo Domingo successfully evicted the Spaniards. A mulatto educated in France, Boyer had not joined the revolutionists until after the capture of Toussaint. He had served under Pétion and shared his "liberal" principles, which he now applied by continuing the distribution of land in small plots. His generosity contributed, as had Pétion's, to the general inertia and misery. Jonathan Brown, a visitor in the 1830's, described what he saw: "Poverty and degradation stare one in the face wherever he goes . . . the population . . . is without sustenance or a disposition to make exertions to obtain it." The nation, he observed, was declining: "and no obstacle seems to exist to prevent their descent into barbarism." The members of congress, he reported, were so illiterate that few could sign their names.

The well-meaning Boyer, with an empty treasury, could do little to maintain order in the nation which now included the angry Spanish-speaking people of the eastern end of the island. Nor did the coveted French recognition in 1825 improve his chances, for it was bought by pledging payment of a 150,000,000 franc indemnity in annual installments and by agreeing to grant French traders a 50 per cent reduction in tariff duties. The inevitable defaults upon the indemnity led to embroiled relations with France. As the internal situation steadily worsened, Boyer abandoned his moderate rule of his idling citizens, resorted to the harsh tactics of Dessalines and Christophe, and compelled the peasants to plow and harvest under armed guard. Boyer continued his ineffective rule until 1843, when a conspiracy of urban mulattoes—the class to which he himself belonged—drove him into exile. In the confusion the people of Santo Domingo broke away and founded their own Dominican Republic. The mulatto conspirators, after ineffective efforts to establish stable government, soon lost their hold to illiterate Negro leaders. So ended the twenty-three-year rule of the occasionally honest, slightly democratic, and moderately intelligent mulattoes.

The Years of Tumult, 1843-1915

The story of Haiti during the seventy-two years following the exile of Boyer is one of almost unrelieved gloom, incompetence, and tyranny. Twenty-two dictators rose and fell, repeated civil disturbances shook the country, and the masses sank to new depths of misery. The Negroes were in almost complete control, with the better educated mulattoes furnishing presidents for only eight of the seventy-two years. The most fantastic period was the twelve-year rule of the ignorant and superstitious Faustin Soulouque (1847-59), expensively installed as Emperor Faustin I (his crown, still to be seen in Port-au-Prince, cost \$100,000), who butchered numerous mulatto leaders, appointed illiterate Negroes to public posts, made two unsuccessful attempts to recapture Santo Domingo, and finally had to flee the country. Among all those who occupied the presidential palace, only three proved more than mediocre. Fabre Geffard (1859-67) cut the army by one-half, built a few schools, organized a school of medicine, promoted public works, signed a concordat with the Vatican which brought some order to the demoralized priesthood, and won recognition from Washington in 1862. The well-educated Lysius Salomon (1879-88) created a national bank, lowered tariffs, opened some rural schools, imported a few French teachers, and brought Haiti into the International Postal Union. Florvil Hyppolite (1889-96) won fame for his bridges, docks, public buildings, telephone and telegraph lines.¹

It was a period of economic and social stagnation. The eroded and ill-tended soil yielded less and less. Coffee from the trees growing wild on the mountain sides furnished the one cash crop. The national treasury was chronically in default on its foreign obligations. The Church, which had suffered from neglect until relations with the Vatican were restored in 1860, furnished a little leadership in education. As late as 1915, more than 90 per cent of the people were illiterate.

The Caste System

We now digress to take account of the hardening of the lines between the two classes in Haitian society, the *élite* and the masses—the rigid caste system which was fixed upon the little nation in the nineteenth century and continues to dominate in the twentieth.²

¹ James G. Leyburn: *The Haitian People*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, p. 99.

² The word *élite* is used by the Haitians themselves to describe members of the upper class.

The *élite*, never more than 2 per cent of the people, are the legatees of the gens de couleur, the freedmen of colonial days. After the murder or exile of the French colonial aristocracy, the mulattoes took over much of the wealth of the erstwhile owners of the land and claimed the political and social supremacy which the whites had held. Under Pétion and Boyer, they held the upper hand. After 1843, as we have noted, they lost control to the Negro leaders, whose followers outnumbered the *élite* by fifty to one. The *élite* were then forced to comfort themselves with the sense of social superiority. Under the shadow of the Negro tyrants, the *élite* became a complacent aristocracy. The *élite* are usually mulattoes, although some pure Negroes win status in their ranks. They pride themselves upon the purity of their French and upon their prowess in music, poetry, and painting. They regard physical labor as demeaning and seek positions in government, or careers in law, medicine, or business. Their sons seldom become teachers or enter the priesthood, for such professions are ill-paid and bring their practitioners uncomfortably close to the masses. They cling to Catholicism as a spiritual symbol of their cherished French tradition. They live in the best houses in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Pétionville, and other towns. They take pride in the seamliness and grace of the Parisian way of life which they claim as their own; their ranks include talented and charming men and women. But their indubitable grace is matched by bland arrogance: between them and the unwashed masses there is a deep gulf, almost as unbridgeable as that which long separated the untouchables of India from their more favored countrymen. Few of the *élite* have taken a stand for the education or the social regeneration of the Negro masses. They have withdrawn to the shelter of their own superiority, seemingly indifferent to the general misery of their land.²

The masses, numbering more than three million, live much as their slave progenitors lived in the eighteenth century. They are almost entirely illiterate, although a few schools are available to those who reside in or near the larger centers. Their language is creole, a blend of French, Spanish, English, and Dutch shaped during the chaotic sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to which were added many words of African root as slaves filled the land in the eighteenth century. Creole is the Haitian language, no matter how fondly the *élite* cling to their Parisian French. Presidents, businessmen, and lawyers must speak creole in order to be understood. Catholicism is the official religion, but Vodun is the secret and powerful religion of the Negroes, a religion imported from Africa and further developed in Haiti. It is a true religion, with a full complement of gods and spirits, and with a ritual for the propitiation and control of su-

² There are grateful exceptions. A few *élite* intellectuals have denounced the failure of their class to recognize the worth of their African inheritance, their proneness to worship French culture, and their refusal to take responsibility for national redemption. See historian Jean Price-Mars: *La vocation de l'élite*. Port-au-Prince: Impr. E. Chenet, 1919.

pernatural powers. There are magic rites, sacrifices, beating of drums, ceremonial dances, incantation of priests, and the casting of spells to influence the course of birth and death, sickness and health, love and hate.

The Haitian masses constitute a peasant society. Few great plantations remain, and the bulk of the land in the valleys and on the mountain slopes is held in tiny plots, which grow ever smaller as holdings are divided with each generation among an increasing number of heirs. Few peasants hold registered titles to their patches of poor soil, but their boundaries are subject to mutual consent. Only in such spots as congested Puerto Rico, Java, and the Nile Valley is there such overcrowding of an agricultural population. There are today about three hundred Haitians to each square mile of valley and mountain slope. With little land, most of it sadly eroded, with little fertilization and use of scientific methods, it is no wonder that the Haitian peasant is among the poorest in the world. Estimates during the American occupation set the average annual income of the Haitian at \$20, but more recent estimates run as high as \$65. Such statistics, however, mean little in a land whose people subsist directly from the soil. Not only is the Haitian poor; he is also sick. Malaria, hookworm, yaws, and intestinal infections take their toll. The mortality rate, especially of infants, is fantastically high although no reliable statistics exist. But the high birth rate exceeds the number of deaths, and the overpopulation of the island is aggravated.

Haiti Under American Occupation, 1915-34

The American marines were landed in Haiti in 1915, and they stayed for nineteen years. This was the United States's answer to the breakdown of orderly government during the violent period 1908-15. During that period seven men had seized the presidency—usually by revolution initiated among the rough *cacos* or mountaineers of the north—and held office briefly; some had then escaped into exile, one was killed by an explosion in the palace, another probably died from poison, and the last was hacked to pieces by an angry mob. Such confusions could not be tolerated in the Caribbean, where the United States held the new Panama Canal; hence President Wilson decided to extend the American police power to Haiti.

The international situation in 1915, with Germany winning by land and sea, also influenced Washington's action. It was rumored that Germany was seeking control of a naval base on Haiti's Mole St. Nicholas. German merchants on the island, principal holders of some \$2,500,000 of temporary loans floated to finance the seven years of *caco* revolts, were appealing to Berlin for help. The French owners of Haitian securities were

pressing their claims, and actually occupied Cap-Haitien briefly. Woodrow Wilson was not minded to permit any European power to gain new foothold in the "American Mediterranean."

Furthermore, Americans had a financial stake in Haiti's national bank and railroads. In 1910 American interests had taken over the national railways, of which but eighty miles of track had been laid after years of plundering by various alien promoters. The new owners had been given a fifty-year concession for completing the line between the capital and Cap-Haitien and had been guaranteed a 6 per cent return on their investment; but little had been accomplished by 1915. The fiasco was variously blamed on managerial incompetence, civil wars, and the failure of the evanescent Haitian governments to pay what they owed. The Banque Nationale de la République d'Haiti, organized in 1910, also concerned the Americans. The National City Bank of New York, although it held only 5 per cent of the shares, represented so much of the predominant German and French interest as to give it virtual control of the Haitian bank. There was an intimate relationship between the New York bank, the Haitian bank, and the Haitian national railways; the New York concern lent a half-million dollars to the railways; and one of its vice-presidents served as president of the railroad company. Meanwhile, the Haitian bank had taken over virtual control of the republic's national finances, floating a loan of \$16,000,000, collecting all customs receipts, paying off amounts due to bondholders, and turning over the remainder to the Haitian treasury. By 1915 American financial interests controlled the nation's banking and railroads, and were understandably apprehensive lest the anarchic confusion wipe out their investment. Fairly or unfairly, they were charged with a large share of responsibility for inviting American armed intervention.⁴

The landing of the American marines in 1915 came as the climax to months of tension. During 1914 there were repeated visits of American warships to Haitian harbors. In December, 1914, alarmed by news of fresh *caco* revolts, an American ship anchored in the harbor of Port-au-Prince and landed a few officers and men who called upon the Haitian bank and withdrew a half-million dollars which they carried off to New York for safekeeping in the National City Bank. Bank officials in Haiti justified their surrender of the funds by citing their obligation to protect foreign bondholders against the irresponsible island government. Patriotic Haitians described the act as highhanded theft.

Then in January, 1915, a *caco* army under Vilbrun Guillaume Sam moved south to capture the capital. At this point American intervention took a new turn. American Admiral William B. Caperton, standing by in coastal waters, informed Sam that there was to be no looting or violence; and lest he forget, the Admiral sent aides to remind the Negro leader at

⁴ See L. L. Montague: *Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938*, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press; 1940, Ch. XII.

each seaport through which he passed. By March, Sam was installed in the presidential palace, his serenity clouded by the presence of American warships on the horizon and by news that a rival *caco* army under a chieftain named Bobo was on its way to oust him. In July, when Bobo's men were fighting their way into Port-au-Prince, Sam filled the prisons with his outspoken critics. On July 27 Sam barely escaped capture by Bobo and took refuge in the French legation. That night, probably by Sam's orders, there was a mass butchery of political prisoners—about 167 were killed, including numerous honored citizens of the *élite* class. The next morning an angry mob headed by grave and respected citizens appeared at the French legation and demanded delivery of Sam. They brushed aside the French minister's protests, found the shabby president under a bed, dragged him out, and threw him over the wall to the mob which literally tore him to pieces and paraded his several parts through the streets. At this point the U.S.S. *Washington* dropped anchor, and Admiral Caperton landed with his marines.

Descriptions of the nineteen-year rule by American marines range from official panegyrics on the blessings conferred upon Haiti, to vitriolic denunciations of the "imperialistic" United States. Neither verdict is altogether fair. There was good in the American occupation, and there was bad. It may be concluded that military occupation, though sometimes necessary, is never palatable to the occupied.

The American military authorities took the necessary steps to regularize their position on the island. They chose as president the *élite* mulatto Sudre Dartiguenave and installed him in the face of popular demand for the Negro *caco* leader Bobo, giving him a puppet role uncomfortable for him and angering to the Haitian people. They put through a treaty reducing Haiti to a political and economic protectorate of the United States; and stipulating that American citizens were to be appointed by the Haitian president to collect customs, advise the treasury, head the constabulary, and direct public works, health programs, and an agricultural training campaign. This treaty, to be in force for ten years (later extended for another ten years), was thrust upon an angry Haitian congress. The next step, adoption of a constitution, provoked fresh indignation. The occupation officials presented the draft prepared in Washington,* and when the Haitian congress refused to ratify it, they ordered President Dartiguenave to dissolve that body. The constitution, "made in the U.S.A.," was then submitted to a national plebiscite, conducted by American marines, and was accepted almost unanimously. Its most dramatic innovation was a provision permitting white foreigners to own land, a privilege denied by every previous constitution.

There was general protest among Haitians against all acts, good and

* The author—according to a report which is still debated—was a young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

bad, of the invaders. Politicians and army officers, cut off from their accustomed profits, found reasons to resist every measure. Honest patriots, understandably outraged by the denial of Haitian sovereignty, wrote spirited indictments. The marines, whose number averaged about two thousand during the period of occupation, were accused of every crime. Most of the charges were unsubstantiated, and on the whole the record of the Americans was good. The most serious error committed by the occupation forces was the revival of the old *corvée* law, under which peasants were drafted for road building. The officers in charge of the road program overreached themselves, transferring workers to road projects far from their homes (an act expressly prohibited by the *corvée* law itself); this incited a *caco* revolt in 1920, whose suppression cost the lives of some two thousand Haitians. That and other grievances were promptly aired in the United States and led to several investigations, official and private, into real and alleged abuses. But in truth it was not the abuses, but the occupation itself, which rankled. There was also a racial aspect; these were white intruders in a Negro nation. Some of the Americans aired their own racial antipathies. The *élite*, cultured and proud, found themselves excluded from certain hotels, clubs, and restaurants. There was a general tightening of racial lines in the fashion familiar to Washington and the American South but unknown to Haiti since its independence.

Under the puppet presidencies of Dartiguenave (1915-22) and Louis Borno (1922-30), American officials controlled the treasury, collected taxes, disbursed funds, effected wise economies, and eliminated graft. Americans organized and directed the Garde d'Haiti, a national constabulary of three thousand men, the best army Haiti ever had. American engineers supervised the building of roads, wharves, lighthouses, water systems, and irrigation projects. American physicians organized a public health program with hospital clinics and training schools for doctors and nurses; they launched effective campaigns against syphilis, yaws, malaria, and hookworm. American agricultural technicians opened a school for farm leaders and extended the program to rural centers. The successes of the American occupation were substantial, but the complaints of the people were not stilled.

The first step toward ending the occupation was taken in 1930 when President Herbert Hoover appointed a commission to meet with leading Haitians. That group recommended that Borno resign in favor of an interim president, who in turn would supervise a free election. The result was the choice of able Stenio Vincent for president (1930-36). Meanwhile, Hoover appointed a wise minister to Haiti, Dana Munro, placed all occupation officials under his direction, and charged him with the task of terminating the stay of Americans as rapidly as he could. The liquidation of the occupation was well under way when Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the American presidency in 1933; responding to the appeal of

Vincent, Roosevelt ordered withdrawal of the marines in 1934. Only a financial mission was left to safeguard American holdings, and that was finally withdrawn in 1941.

Independent Haiti, 1934—

The departure of the marines in mid-1934 was celebrated as Haiti's second emancipation, and politicians and army officers prepared to recapture their long-lost privileges. During the quarter-century that followed, friends of Haiti have had opportunity to assess the results of the nation's tutelage under marine rule.

Politically, the island republic seems as far from democracy as it was during the chaotic days before the marines landed. The Americans had imposed a shift of political responsibility from the illiterate Negroes to the relatively enlightened mulatto leaders such as Dartiguenave, Borno, and Vincent. After the removal of the marines, momentum kept Vincent in power until 1941, when he passed the office on to another intelligent mulatto, Elie Lescot, who ruled wisely until 1946. In that year the masses, restive under the mulatto leaders, struck for a return to Negro leadership, ousted Lescot, and put Dumarsais Estimé in the presidency. It was now clear that the effective rulers of Haiti were the troops of the Garde d'Haiti trained by the Americans, and especially the five hundred men of the Palace Guard. It was they, with the clamor of the masses behind them, who brought return to Negro leadership.

Estimé sounded the old battle cries, talked of the inevitable clash between the authentiques and nonauthentiques, making clear that the Negroes were the "authentics." His acerbity softened as he found it necessary to appease the city élite, but he stirred up fresh disputes with his more powerful neighbors, Batista in Cuba, and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Estimé was planning to perpetuate himself in office when in 1950 the same Palace Guard which had installed him in power unseated him in favor of a military junta. Within a few months Colonel Paul Magloire, another Negro and the strong man of the army, who had been chiefly responsible for both making and breaking Estimé, was properly elected and installed for a six-year term.

Certainly the ablest man to reach the presidency for many decades, Magloire went at his task with vigor: he persuaded the United States to finance irrigation projects, instituted vigorous health programs, enlarged the public school system, and encouraged improved agricultural methods. But when it became clear that he planned to stay in power beyond his legal term, he was forced from office in December, 1956, by a general strike. Then, within a period of eight months, there were seven makeshift govern-

ments, while disorders spread. In September, 1957, François Duvalier was installed as president after an election of dubious legality. He was still in power in 1960, thanks to the aid of the United States, which evidently regarded this latest dictator as the least of possible evils. Duvalier lived under the threat of invasion from Cuba, where Fidel Castro was planning an attack on the Dominican Republic by way of Haiti. In August, 1959, one such expedition was routed.

In 1959 Duvalier undertook to discipline the Catholic clergy which had criticized his dictatorship: two priests were expelled from the island for "reasons of internal security"; and when about a thousand clergy, nuns, and other faithful churchmen dared to meet for protest, Duvalier's police arrested sixty of them; then, when the Archbishop denounced the President, an order was issued for his arrest—but the outcry was so great that Duvalier prudently gave up his battle with the Church. Washington, newly sensitive to the often repeated charge that it upholds the hands of dictators, suffered acute embarrassment as it continued to keep Duvalier in office.

Internationally, Haiti seems to be persuaded of the utility of close co-operation with the United States. During World War II, Lescot was a loyal ally, declaring war on the Axis and increasing production of vital materials as best he could. Estimé made a few flamboyant speeches in denunciation of "United States imperialism," but was brought to time by Magloire. Magloire was intelligent and knew that the United States offered the surest market for the coffee, sugar, sisal, and bananas that Haiti could produce. Duvalier, whether out of conviction or caution, has accepted the help of Washington. And the United States, by repeated loans, has made clear its willingness to co-operate in the task of healing the island's sick economy.

But the years since 1934 have brought trouble with Haiti's nearer neighbors. The lack of adequate employment within Haiti forced tens of thousands to move to Cuba for the sugar harvesting. During the 1930's, from forty to fifty thousand went each year, and some remained. But the Cuban strong man Batista, hostile to any increase in African blood on his island, vigorously put an end to the immigration. Meanwhile other thousands were crossing the Dominican border to work in the cane fields of that more prosperous country, and many of these casual migrants failed to return. In 1937 the Dominican dictator Trujillo was confronted by the presence of some 60,000 Haitians who had settled permanently on Dominican soil and unreckoned thousands who had moved in as harvest hands. Determined to make the Dominican Republic a "white" nation, Trujillo resorted to a pogrom as the quickest way to rid his country of this Negro incubus; in 1937, in a series of butcheries, from 10,000 to 20,000 Haitians were killed in cold blood. Under American pressure, Trujillo promised to pay Haiti an indemnity of \$750,000.

But the nagging question on Haiti remains: how can some 3.5 mil-

lion people, more than 300 to the square mile in a land the size of Maryland, get enough to eat from the exhausted soil of its valleys and mountain slopes? The United Nations sent a commission to the island in 1949, which reported: "The fundamental economic problem of Haiti derives from relentless pressure of a steadily growing, insufficiently educated population upon limited, vulnerable and—so far as agricultural land is concerned—alarmingly shrinking natural resources." The Haitians, with United States support, are making heroic efforts. The valley of the Artibonite River, which cuts midway across the country from east to west, source of much wealth to the French in the eighteenth century but now wasted by ruinous floods and overcultivation, is the scene of a projected "Haitian TVA." Launched in 1951 by Magloire, its budget of \$14,000,000 has been largely financed by the United States. The plan called for dams which would prevent floods, yield 40,000 KWH of electric power, and open up 80,000 acres for settlement. By 1960 the dams had been built, but the great generators were not yet installed. The total cost to this date was about \$40 million. However, almost 100,000 people were using the land which had been opened up, and there was irrigation water to make possible increase in rice production. President Duvalier was asking for an additional \$7 million to complete the project. Other efforts are being made to improve the quality and output of the lagging coffee industry and to increase the production of sugar, sisal, bananas, and numerous other products. Meanwhile, the plight of Haiti, according to Raymond E. Crist, is that it "has neither a one-crop nor a self-sufficient economy—rather it has a bite-your-nails economy."